“With this agreement, we have ruled out a major humanitarian crisis in Idlib,” Erdogan told reporters at the press conference with Putin. The Sochi Agreement (Russian: “Cоглашение о принципах мирного урения грузино-осетинские о принципах мирного урегг грования грузино-осетинского кота” was a ceasefire agreement that would have marked the end of the Georgian-Ossitist and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts, which on 24 June were signed between Georgia and Russia in Sochi on 6 June 1992, the ceasefire with Abkhazia on 27 July 1993. Russia negotiated a ceasefire and negotiated the 1992 agreement. The agreement initially establishes a ceasefire between Georgian and South Ossetian forces, but it also defines a conflict zone around Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, and established a security corridor along the border of the as yet unde recognized areas of South Ossetia. The agreement also established a joint monitoring commission and a peacekeeping body, the Peacekeeping Forces Group (JPKF). Under Russian command, the JPKF was composed of peacekeeping forces from Georgia, Russia and North Ossetia (the separatist government of South Ossetia had not yet been recognized; However, South Ossetia peacekeepers served in the North Ossetian contingent). In addition, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has agreed to monitor the ceasefire and facilitate negotiations. T12  The OSCE has attempted to eliminate sources of tension, support the existing ceasefire and put in place a broader political framework to mitigate long-term disharmony.   On 6 and 7 March 27, 2003, Georgian President Eduard Scheverdnadze and Russian President Vladimir Putin again signed a new agreement, which should include economic rehabilitation, the resumption of railway networks and the attraction of international investment. This would turn into disappointment, especially for Georgians.   A big question is, of course, how long Turkey will remain on Syrian territory, given Erdogan`s stated intention to transfer about 1.5 million refugees from its current camps in Turkey.
The “safe zone” can also turn into a “safe haven” for anti-Assad forces, who are currently playing the role of Erdogan`s facilitators in Operation Spring Peace and advancing their own agenda, which runs counter to some of Erdogan`s commitments under the Sochi agreement. Moreover, the fate of thousands of IS fighters in Kurdish detention, whom Damascus claims to have been taken to Iraq by US forces, remains undetermined. Will Erdogan take over as the new guard of ISIS prisoners, as the White House recently claimed, or will he instead recruit them into his military, as he has already done according to various reports? Celik said it is not only violations of the Sochi agreement, but also Russia`s promises that are being violated by the regime. Erdogan`s negative reaction to Criticism of Iran has been widely rejected by Tehran`s media, and at this point, the appearance of an undesirable (minor) setback in Iranian-Turkish relations can be taken for granted. Some aspects of the Sochi deal are aimed at Iran, but others are not, leading to a predictable mixed welcome. Finally, there is a widespread perception in Iran that, regardless of Erdogan`s verbal obligations regarding Syrian integrity, he has in practice nibbled away at two consecutive years on Syrian territory, with the prospect of major abuses in the next operation. In 2003, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Georgian President Shevardnadze and Abkhaz Prime Minister Gennady Gagulia and launched a Sochi process to establish a Georgian-Russian-Abkhaz Working Group on Confidence-Building Measures (CBM). The parties have tried to facilitate the return of refugees and economic reconstruction.
The Sochi process meant a retreat from the multilateral to a bilateral format that left Georgia alone to confront Russia and the Abkhazians. . . .